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Chapter 12
Private Import Safety Regulation  
and Transnational New Governance
Errol Meidinger
The world is awash in complex systems of private regulation, many of 







must  be  accommodated  in  global  production  systems.  Safety  regula-
tion  is currently  spread out among a  large number of public and pri-
vate  organizations,  often  with  overlapping  or  competing  roles,  which 
can be thought of as constituting “regulatory ecosystems.” Regulatory 
actors  will  have  to  develop  new  strategies  for  maximizing  the  effects 
of these polycentric authority structures. Moreover, most private safety 








“Regulation”  is  simply  formalized  social  control  that  aims  to  estab-
lish a desired  level of order  in a given field of human activity.  It  typ-
ically  defines  the  duties  of  different  kinds  of  actors  through  rules  or 




governmental  actors  engage  in  every  facet  of  safety  regulation,  from 
standard-setting and adoption through inspection, monitoring, and en-
forcement. As we will see, most private regulatory programs are none-
theless  deeply  intertwined  with  governmental  and  intergovernmental 
regulatory  structures.  Moreover,  many  have  developed  increasingly 








safety  testing  and  standard-setting,  Underwriters  Laboratories  (UL), 
started to conduct thousands of laboratory tests of products such as arc 




Many  such  organizations,  some  for-profit  and  others  not-for-profit, 
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private  incentives  included  businesses’  reliance  on  available  product 
standards to reduce transaction costs and the competitive value of hav-
ing a reputation for safe products.




bodies,  the  International  Organization  for  Standardization  (ISO).  It 
is impossible to know exactly how many product safety standards exist, 
yet  we  do  know  they  number  in  the  many  thousands.  Any  complex 
product capable of causing  injury  is  likely  to  involve dozens of  safety 
standards,  some  for  the  product  as  a  whole  and  some  for  individual 
components.
  Moreover,  for  many  products  there  are  multiple,  often  competing 
regulatory programs.  Some may be private,  others  public. This  regu-
latory complexity is sharply amplified by international trade. Both pro-












  The  most  dynamic  field  of  international  product  safety  regulation 
at present  is  food. Although  it may seem technologically  simple,  food 
production  is often highly complex and  involves many biological and 
chemical  components  that  can  change  and  interact  quickly.  Food  is 
also a sensitive issue, since it is both essential and ingested. The enor-





nongovernmental organizations  (NGOs). At  the  same  time,  the  roles 
of private and public regulators across national boundaries are highly 
interconnected and fluid. This chapter thus examines food safety reg-
ulation  as  a  major  field  of  transnational  “new  governance,”  and  uses 







transparency,  stakeholder  participation,  increased  reliance  on  “soft 
law,”  stress  on  policy  experimentation  and  learning,  and  implemen-
tation through a wide array of mechanisms that include general stan-
dards  and  rules,  contracts,  independent  monitoring,  benchmarking, 
and institutionalization (Lobel 2004).
  Decentralized  (or  perhaps  better,  polycentric)  authority  structures 
and efforts  to  institute experimentation and learning are the key fea-
tures of new governance  for purposes of  analyzing  import  safety  reg-
ulation.  Decentralization  involves  the  increasingly  broad  distribution 
of  governance  functions  among  a  wide  array  of  social  actors,  includ-
ing government bodies, business firms, trade associations, professional 





anisms  of  coordination  (or  sometimes,  a  worrying  lack  of  coordina-
tion). Decentralization  is driven by many factors,  including shrinking 
state capacity, the increasing complexity of governance problems, and 
the  expanding  regulatory  capacity  of  nonstate  institutions,  as  well  as 
broad changes in contemporary thinking about regulatory institutions 
(Lobel 2004).
  Experimentation  and  learning  are  critical  to  new  governance  be-
cause of the high degree of complexity, uncertainty, and rapid change 
that characterizes most regulatory arenas and the consequent need to 
constantly  assess  progress,  adjust  policies,  and  learn  from  other  are-
nas of governance. The use of soft law methods, such as recommenda-
tions, principles, voluntary standards, benchmarking practices, and the 
like,  follows  from  the difficulty of  imposing mandatory  requirements 
and the value of retaining experimentation and learning. The same is 




















the  growth  of  transnational  trade  and  communication  increases  the 
need for transnational governance, with the consequence that a great 
number  of  innovative  governance  institutions  are  constantly  being 
established, tested, and revamped (Abbott and Snidal 2009; Mei dinger 
2008a).
Recent Growth in Private Safety Regulation
Private safety regulation is booming for many reasons, among them the 
limitations of government regulators and the distinctive capacities and 
interests  of  private  regulators.  Private  regulators  also  appear  to  have 










  Regulatory  programs  can  be  broken  down  into  several  basic  func-
tions,  including  standard-setting  and  rule-making,  adoption,  imple-
mentation,  inspection and monitoring, and sanctioning (Henson and 
Humphrey 2008). Over the years certain institutional patterns have be-
come common  in private  regulation  for each of  these  functions,  and 
they bear many similarities to government regulation.
  Private  standard-setting processes have gradually moved  from rely-
ing primarily on technical expertise to combining such expertise with 
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expanded  participation,  transparency,  and  multistakeholder  decision 
making.  Ideally,  standard-setting bodies  include  representatives of all 
relevant  interests  and  seek  to  operate  by  consensus  (ISO/IEC  1994; 
WTO/ TBT 2000).






regulatory  standards  is  essential  to  regulatory  success  and  because 
those capacities are rapidly expanding in some cases, due to advances 
in supply chain management, discussed below.




ducers  receive  formal  certification  of  compliance  with  the  standard, 







ers  value  the  certification.  NGO  activists  can  also  leverage  sanctions 
by  pointing  to  lack  of  certification  as  an  indicator  of  poor  corporate 
citizenship.
  While  substantive  product  quality  or  performance  standards  were 
long the sine qua non of private regulatory programs, they are increas-
ingly being displaced or absorbed by management or system standards. 






As  noted  earlier,  supply  chain  control  has  become  a  major  factor  in 
the effectiveness of private regulation. The rapid development of sup-
ply chain management over  the past  two decades,  and  its  integration 
into operations management, has meant that powerful actors along the 






















become  “hostages  of  each  other”  in  highly  sensitive  industries  (Rees 
1996).  This  condition,  in  which  an  entire  industry  is  dependent  on 
effective regulation, can give rise to rapid development of private reg-
ulation under certain conditions, or calls for public regulation if effec-
tive  industry-wide private regulation  is  too difficult  to achieve, as has 
recently been the case in the food industry.
Private Food Safety Regulation
The  main  engine  of  private  food  safety  regulation  over  the  past  two 
















  Consequently,  to minimize both legal  liability and brand risk, Brit-
ish retailers embarked on intensive efforts  to establish quality control 
systems  that  could  identify  their  products’  sources  and  conditions  of 
production.  Given  that  much  of  the  British  food  supply  is  imported, 
these systems were inherently  transnational. It soon became apparent 

























hazard analysis  and critical  control point  (HACCP) management  sys-
tems. HACCP systems  involve proactively  searching  for and analyzing 
safety hazards, identifying critical control points where the hazards can 
be managed or eliminated, establishing preventive measures with crit-
ical  limits  for  each  control  point,  monitoring  the  control  points,  tak-
ing corrective actions where critical limits are exceeded, keeping good 
records,  and  regularly  verifying  that  the  system  is  working  properly. 
The EUREPGAP standard centered on the HAACP strategy, and cre-
ated a number of predefined critical control points. These were divided 
into  “major  musts”  for  which  100  percent  compliance  was  required, 
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“minor musts,” for which 95 percent compliance was required, and rec-
ommended  control  points,  leaving  significant  but  constrained  discre-
tion to producers (Campbell 2005).
  Soon thereafter, at  the request of retailers, EUREP produced stan-
dards  for  coffee,  tea,  ornamental  plants,  livestock,  and  aquaculture. 
EUREP also began using ISO accredited third-party certifiers  to con-






clude  not  only  requirements  directly  related  to  food  quality,  but  also 
environmental  protection  and  worker  health  and  safety,  thus  encom-
passing both consumption and production externalities. GLOBALGAP 
has also sought to address the disadvantages faced by small producers 
(a  producer  certification  can  cost  anywhere  from  several  hundred  to 







of  the  mix. The  UK Assured Food Standard,  for  example,  was  devel-
oped by a coalition of producer organizations and grants rights to use 









GFSI  concentrates  solely  on  food  safety  and  excludes  quality,  environ-
mental,  and  social  concerns. GFSI  is governed by an appointed board 
of nine retailers, three manufacturers, and one food service. The board 
currently  includes  officers  of  Coca-Cola,  Hormel,  Walmart,  and  the 
China  Resources  Vanguard  Company,  among  others  (Food  Business 
Forum 2008).
  ISO also recently entered the fray with its 22000 standard, intended 
to  provide  an  “internationally  recognized  standard  for  a  food  safety 








up  of  a  multitude  of  large  and  small  regulatory  systems.  Some  focus 
solely  and  narrowly  on  safety  issues;  others  include  safety  in  a  larger 
set  of  food  quality,  environmental,  and  social  concerns.  All  rely  to  a 
great extent on the HACCP strategy of proactively searching for poten-









seem  to  have  grown  in  importance  in  both  Europe  and  the  United 









332).  While  governments  have  regained  some  of  that  authority,  they 
cannot take it for granted—nor should they. Governments do not have 
the capacity to protect public safety all on their own, and they should 
not  expend  resources  to  carry  out  functions  that  private  regulatory 
actors  can  perform  within  the  cost  structures  of  their  products.  The 
question is: What regulatory roles do and should governments play?
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ents of resources and public acceptance. For example, Iizuka and Bor-
bon-Galvez (2008) describe the variety of regulatory functions—from 
standard-setting  to  sanctioning—carried  out  by  various  public  and 
private  actors  in  the Chilean  salmon fishing and Mexican  fresh  agri-
cultural produce  industries. These actors  range  from  industry associ-
ations,  private  purchasers,  and  independent  standard-setting  bodies 




















While  these constraints are detailed more  fully  in chapter 4,  it  is  im-




3[a]) and  that  the Technical Barriers  to Trade (TBT) Agreement  re-
quires governments adopting nonfood safety standards to give special 
consideration to existing international standards (TBT 1994: art. 2.4). 
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food  safety  programs  in  recent  years  (USDA/ERS 2007).  Congress  is 
also in the process of mandating much greater use of private regulatory 













  However,  the  evidence  on  trade  barriers  is  complex.  Although  it 
seems  clear  that  it  would  be  cheaper  for  any  given  producer  to  meet 
only  home  country  standards  and  not  pay  for  certification,  often  the 
only  way  for  southern  producers  to  sell  into  northern  markets  is  to 
meet  standards  accepted  by  northern  consumers.  There  is  some  re-





between  northern  consumers  and  southern  suppliers.  They  may  also 
improve  northern  consumer  confidence,  thereby  increasing  demand. 
There is also some evidence that private regulatory programs may im-
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ent parts of the world inevitably have different values (Epps 2009) and 




cle 13 directs governments  to  “take  such reasonable measures as may 
be  available  to  them  to  ensure  that  nongovernmental  entities  within 
their  territories . . . comply  with  the  relevant  provisions”  of  the  SPS 
Agreement, the meaning of compliance is still to be worked out (Epps 
2009).  Currently  the  SPS  Committee  is  undertaking  a  general  study 
to  compare  private  standards  with  international  and  official  require-
ments (WTO/SPS 2008). Regarding nonfood safety standards, the TBT 
Agreement  is  even  less directive,  although  the TBT Committee  inter-
prets it as encouraging good governance practices in the setting of stan-
dards (WTO/TBT 2000).









ing  ability  of  powerful  firms  to  manage  information  and  control  the 
operations of extended and complex supply chains. When these capac-
ities  are  harnessed  to  appropriate  incentives,  private  regulatory  pro-
grams can be enormously effective. There is reason to believe that the 




ditions.  Moreover,  the  practices  thus  established  seem  to  have  had 
network  effects,  as  other  European  food  certification  systems  operat-
ing  under  less  rigorous  liability  systems  developed  similarly  stringent 
requirements. Over  time, moreover,  it  is  likely  that practices  adopted 
to control risks will become institutionalized in taken-for-granted rou-
tines of regulated organizations.
246     Errol Meidinger











  Because  private  regulatory  programs  compete  with  each  other  for 
consumer trust and commercial acceptance,  they also have systematic 
interests in learning. There is considerable evidence of competing reg-
ulatory  programs  adopting  standards  and  practices  from  each  other 
where they work, and also differentiating themselves from one another 
in hopes of achieving improved results or acceptance. In general, pri-
vate  regulatory  systems  can  adapt  to  changed  circumstances  much 
more quickly than government ones.
  Government regulatory programs can maximize their own effective-
ness  by  maximizing  the  effectiveness  of  private  regulatory  programs. 
They  will  thus  be  most  successful  when  they  seek  to  align  the  incen-
tives of organizations capable of imposing significant supply chain con-





States,  this  will  require  significant  change.  Government  agencies  will 






Private  import  safety  regulation  typically  relies  on  the  market  power 




Private Import Safety Regulation     247






are  retaining  most  of  the  surplus  generated  by  private  safety  regula-
tory systems, southern interests—especially in large economies such as 
China,  India,  and Brazil—will have an  incentive  to create  competing 
programs and brand identities to take some of that surplus back (Hen-
son  and  Humphrey  2008:  16).  Thus,  private  import  safety  regulators 
will have to attend carefully  to questions of distributive  justice  if  they 
hope to persist.
  There  is  also  an  important  question  of  the  fairness  of private  reg-
ulatory  systems  to  small  producers.  Management  system  and  record-
keeping requirements, like most regulatory requirements, are generally 
more difficult for small enterprises to implement, and certification fees 
are  relatively  more  burdensome.  Some  ameliorative  steps  have  been 







ests  over  others  (Tullock  1967)—is  a  problem  in  all  regulatory  pro-
grams,  public  and  private.  Competition  among  regulatory  programs 





remove  considerable  regulatory  power  from  southern  countries,  and 
they often express  concern about  that  fact. While  some of  this prob-
lem  may  be  alleviated  by  the  legitimacy  strategies  discussed  later  in 
this chapter, it is also important to note that researchers have recently 
found  that  southern  countries  experience  benefits  in  using  regula-
tory standards developed in the north. In their studies of the Chilean 
salmon  and  Mexican  fresh  produce  industries,  Iizuka  and  Borbon-
Galvez (2008) find that the availability of working packages of private 
standards and  implementation  institutions benefits  resource-strapped 
southern  countries  because  they  can  avoid  expending  resources  on 
248     Errol Meidinger















erners  interested  in  import  regulation  are  primarily  concerned  with 







  The  food  safety  programs  have  begun  to  incorporate  representa-
tives of producer and southern interests, thus expanding their account-
ability.  But  it  is  not  clear  how  far  this  expansion  of  stakeholders  will 
go; at present decision making appears likely to remain dominated by 
retailers  and producers, usually  relatively  large ones. The  interests of 
many other constituencies (e.g.,  southern consumers,  laborers, north-










that  there  are  multiple  publics  with  multiple  legitimacy  standards.  It 
















rough  concepts  of  “input”  and  “output”  legitimacy.  Input  legitimacy 
refers to the procedural pedigree of a policy,  including the degree of 




  On  the  input  side,  we  see  that  most  private  safety  regulatory  pro-






  On  the  output  side,  well-managed  private  safety  regulation  pro-
grams  have  the  capacity  to  significantly  improve  the  control  of  risks 
to  safety. They may also  improve  the positions of  affected  stakehold-
ers if properly constructed. Effectiveness and fairness can thus be seen 






  However,  these  prospective  legitimacy  gains  remain deeply  contin-
gent. Significant failure in one portion of the regulatory ecosystem has 
the  capacity  to  undermine  the  legitimacy  of  programs  in  other  por-
tions. Thus,  each program has  an  interest  in preventing  catastrophic 
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failures in other nearby ones while still competing with them. Whether 
they will manage to so coordinate themselves remains to be seen.
Regulatory Legitimacy in a New Era
Today’s  transnational  safety  regulatory  system  is  made  up  of  a  multi-
tude of competing, yet partially interdependent, public and private reg-
ulatory programs  in which most  regulatory  functions  are  carried out 
by both government and private entities. While this regulatory plural-
ism  has  considerable  advantages,  individual  actors  in  the  system  also 
face major challenges in determining how to relate to other actors and 
the  regulatory  ecosystem  as  a  whole.  Doing  so  will  probably  require 
much more improvisational, adaptive, and cooperative strategies than 
many regulators—particularly government agencies accustomed to rel-
ative monopolies—are accustomed  to.  In  trying  to protect  the public 
interest, government agencies will have to find ways to take advantage 
of useful private regulatory practices and curb problematic ones. They 




  Ultimately,  the  existence  of  multiple  public  and  private  regulators 
means that there  is an ongoing contest  for regulatory  legitimacy, and 
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